Hi, Seyyed (Is it Bahram?)<br /><br />Bear with me, I am making progress. Unfortunately, editing submissions keep arriving from China.<br /><br />This is the Abstract. I think it's clearer.&nbsp;<br /><br />
<p><strong>Abstract</strong></p>
Phenomenal Externalism (PE) has been proposed to resolve the problems associated with the intentional aspect of mental content. However, by privileging the external object over the internal structure to be what the qualitative characteristics of experience (qualia) are identified with, the introspective (phenomenal) aspect of experience is difficult to explain. For PE, this has become an Achilles&rsquo; heel, to which its opponents direct their objections. In this paper, some possibilities are considered to equip PE in such a way that several of the objections can be answered. In fact, it is shown here that a degree of subjectivity can be returned to <em>qualia </em>conception even within a PE framework. Bergson claims that perception is made <em>in</em> things and that pure perception and objective reality are united, though not identical. To clarify this unity, a computer rendering analogy is used, claiming that qualia look like the product of the mental rendering of things which results in locating some phenomenal properties &ldquo;in&rdquo; things. It is discussed that, on the one hand, qualia turn out to be objective in the sense that they are unified with external entities, but, on the other hand, they are subjective since they are unified with the mind. Thus, to be &ldquo;in&rdquo; the thing is discussed in the sense of being &ldquo;united with&rdquo; and &ldquo;inseparable from&rdquo; both the thing and the mind.&nbsp;<br /><br /><br />Best wishes - George